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The Right to Redemption: Juvenile Dispositions and
Sentences
Katherine Hunt Federle
INTRODUCTION
The punishment of juveniles remains a troubling yet under-theorized
aspect of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. These systems
emphasize accountability, victim restoration, and retribution as reasons to
punish underage offenders. In fact, American juvenile systems will
remove the most egregious offenders to criminal courts for trial and
sentencing. The United States Supreme Court in recent years, however,
has issued a number of opinions emphasizing that the Eighth Amendment
requires that the punishment of children must account for their lesser moral
culpability, developmental immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation.1
State courts also have begun to reconsider their own dispositional and
sentencing schemes in light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.2
The reality of` juveniles’ immaturity militates in favor of a right to
redemption. This Article begins by discussing the available data about the
number and types of dispositions juveniles receive, waivers to criminal
court, and the criminal sentences imposed. The analysis also considers the
collateral consequences for minors who are adjudicated delinquent or who
are criminally convicted. The discussion then turns to the effects of juvenile
and criminal court involvement on children and the subsequent impact on
life outcomes. The analysis considers theoretical, jurisprudential, and
constitutional implications of juvenile sentencing with a special emphasis
on the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. This Article concludes with the
proposal for the contours of a right to redemption and its implications for
reform to the current system and suggests strategies for the individual
defense lawyer.

Copyright 2016, by KATHERINE HUNT FEDERLE.
 Joseph S. Platt-Porter Wright Morris and Arthur Professor of Law and
Director, Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at the Ohio State
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law.
1. See infra notes 141–70 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
2. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) (rejecting mandatory
minimum adult sentences imposed on juveniles); Diatchenko v. Commonwealth, 1
N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013) (abolishing life without parole for juveniles).
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I. THE PUNISHMENT OF JUVENILES
A. Juvenile Court
The empirical evidence suggests that young offenders—particularly
those of color—remain at risk for harsh punishment. Despite significant
declines in the number of cases and offenders handled by juvenile courts,
disproportionality is evident at each decision-making point. Thus some
youth of color are more likely to be court-involved and to receive the
harshest dispositions than white youth. Moreover, more juveniles,
especially minority youth, are being tried in criminal court as adults, thus
bypassing the juvenile justice system entirely. As a consequence, more
youth will experience criminal sanctions.
For example, the number of cases handled in juvenile courts has
declined significantly in the past few decades. In 2013, juvenile courts
handled 1,058,500 cases, 44% fewer than were handled in 1997 and 9%
fewer than in 1985.3 Nevertheless, the percentage of petitioned cases has
increased. In 1985, 46% of delinquency cases were petitioned; by 1998,
57% of all delinquency cases were petitioned, before falling to 55% in
2013.4 Furthermore, the likelihood of formal processing not only increased
between 1985 and 2013 but also across all offense categories. The
likelihood of formal case processing increased from 48% to 58% for public
order cases, 43% to 53% for property offense cases, 43% to 49% for drug
offense cases, and 53% to 57% for person offense cases.5
In 2013, 50% of all petitioned delinquency cases involved children
under the age of 16. Of those children, 58% were white and 76% were
male.6 However, formal case processing was more likely for cases
involving older youth; in 2013 the likelihood of formal case processing for
teens 16 and older increased to 59%, up from 51% in 1985.7 Moreover,
although the likelihood of formal case processing increased across all
racial groups, cases involving black youth were more likely to be formally
processed than those involving white youth.8 In 2013, 61% of all
3. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV.
JUST., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2013, at 6 (2015).
4. Julie Furdella & Charles Puzzanchera, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile
Court, 2013, JUV. OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS NAT’L REP. SERIES FACT SHEET (Off.
of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.) Oct. 2015, at 3.
5. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 3, at 36.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 37.
8. Id.
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petitioned delinquency cases involved black youth compared to 52% for
white youth.9 Additionally, formal processing for blacks was substantially
more likely than for whites across all offense categories.10
Of the 55% of cases processed formally, slightly more than half resulted
in adjudication.11 Stated differently, in 2013, 31% of all delinquency cases
resulted in either adjudication of delinquency or waiver to criminal court,
similar to the level reported in 1985.12 Although the number of all adjudicated
cases declined by 4% between 1985 and 2013, the number of adjudicated
person offense cases and public order offense cases increased substantially,
while the number of adjudicated property offense cases declined.13 Youth
under the age of 16 comprised 51% of all adjudicated delinquency cases, but
65% of all adjudicated forcible rape cases, 76% of other violent sex offenses,
and 73% of all adjudicated arson cases.14 Of adjudicated cases, 22% involved
female offenders and 61% of adjudicated youth were white.15
Probation was the most frequently imposed disposition. In 2013, 64%
of adjudicated youth received probation,16 a 6% increase in the number of
cases since 1985, although the actual number of youth on probation has
declined.17 Of adjudicated cases resulting in probation, 34% involved
property offenses, 27% involved person offenses, 26% involved public
order offenses, and 13% involved drug offenses.18 Although the likelihood
of being placed on probation has increased since 1985 for both older and
younger children, children 15 and younger are more likely to be placed on
probation than children 16 and older.19 Of children 15 or younger, 67%
received a disposition of probation in 2013, while 60% of children 16 and
older received probation.20 The likelihood of being placed on probation
also increased for both males and females since 1985.21

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
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Although all racial groups saw an increase in the likelihood of being
placed on probation,22 important differences nevertheless exist across
race. American-Indian youth, for example, saw a substantial increase in
the likelihood of being placed on probation. In 1985, 40% of these youth
received a disposition of probation compared to 61% in 2013.23 For Asian
youth, the likelihood of being placed on probation increased from 64% in
1985 to 74% in 2013, and for white youth the likelihood of receiving
probation increased from 57% to 65%.24 For black youth, however, the
likelihood of being placed on probation increased only from 60% in 1985
to 61% in 2013.25 Across specific offenses, white, black, and AmericanIndian youth were most likely to receive probation for drug offenses, while
Asian youth were most likely to receive probation for public order
offenses.26 Asian youth, however, were far more likely to receive
probation across all offense categories than any other racial group.27
Out-of-home placements were ordered in about one-fourth of all
adjudicated cases in 2013, a decline from 1985 when out-of-home
dispositions were ordered in 31% of the cases formally adjudicated.28
Moreover, from 1985 to 2013, cases involving out-of-home placements
decreased by 26% to its lowest level in 2013.29 Nevertheless, the types of
cases warranting placement outside the home have remained fairly
consistent. In 2013, approximately one-third of all placements outside the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Juvenile courts ordered probation in 74% of the drug cases involving
white youth, 69% of the cases involving black youth, and 72% of the cases
involving American Indians. Juvenile courts ordered probation in 76% of the
public order cases involving Asian youth compared to 57% for whites, 54% for
blacks, and 60% for American Indians. Id.
27. Id. Juvenile courts placed Asian youth on probation in 75% of person
offense cases, 71% of property offenses, and 76% of public order cases. No data is
available for drug cases because of the small numbers of Asian youth adjudicated
for these offenses. Id.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Id. at 46. Moreover, significant declines based on gender occurred. In
2013, 26% of adjudicated males and 19% of adjudicated females received a
disposition of out-of-home placement compared to 32% and 27% respectively in
1985. Declines based on age also were evident. Of adjudicated juveniles 16 and
older, 27% received a disposition of out-of-home placement in 2013 compared to
31% in 1985, while 21% of adjudicated juveniles 15 and younger were placed out
of home in 2013 compared to 32% in 1985. Id. at 48.
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home were for property offenses, although the proportion has declined
since 1985, while 31% of placements outside the home involved public
order offenses.30 An additional 29% of out-of-home placements involved
person offenses, while 8% involved drug cases.31
The likelihood of receiving an out-of-home placement declined across all
racial groups between 1985 and 2013 with some groups experiencing
significant decreases in the likelihood of out-of-home placement. In 2013,
American-Indian juveniles were placed outside the home in 24% of the
adjudicated cases compared to 41% of the cases in 1985.32 Similarly, Asian
youth received an out-of-home disposition in 18% of the adjudicated cases in
2013, but comprised 31% of such placements in 1985.33 Declines were more
modest but still significant for black and white youth. In 2013, black youth
were placed out of the home in 27% of adjudicated cases compared to 34% of
those cases in 1985, and white youth were placed outside the home in 23% of
the adjudicated cases compared to 30% in 1985.34
Despite reductions in the use of out-of-home placements, notable racebased differences exist. Black children were more likely to be placed out
of the home than any other racial group in 2013. Moreover, black youth
were most likely to be placed out of the home in property, drug, and public
order offense cases, while American-Indian youth were most likely to be
placed outside the home in person offense cases. Black juveniles were
involved in 27% of property, 21% of drug, and 27% of public order offense
cases resulting in an out-of-home placement.35 Of all adjudicated person
offense cases resulting in an out-of-home placement, however, 31%
involved American Indians compared to 29% involving blacks, 25%
whites, and 20% Asians.36
The disproportionality evident at each decision-making point
contributes to the overall disparity of the system. Although black youth
comprised 16% of the youth population in the United States in 2013, they
constituted 35% of all delinquency cases handled by the juvenile courts
and were more than twice as likely to be referred to juvenile court as white

30. Id. at 46.
31. Id. Public order offenses include escapes, weapons offenses, and probation
and parole violations, which might explain the relatively high number of these cases
resulting in out-of-home placements. Id.
32. Id. at 48.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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youth.37 Furthermore, as cases involving black youth proceed through the
juvenile system, the disproportionality becomes more pronounced and has
more serious consequences. For example, the rate at which referred cases
were formally processed was 20% greater for black youth than for white,
and black youth comprised 42% of all person offense cases in juvenile
courts.38 Additionally, the rate at which black youth were ordered into
residential placement after adjudication was 20% greater than for white
youth, while white youth were more likely to receive a disposition of
probation.39 In sum, despite declining rates of juvenile offending, youth of
color—and especially black youth—experience disproportionate court
involvement and are more likely to receive harsher punishment.
B. Criminal Court
A significant number of youth are denied even the limited benefit of
juvenile court. In 2013, juvenile court judges sent 1%—approximately
4,000 cases—of all petitioned delinquency cases to criminal court for
trial,40 although the number of cases waived has declined by 31% since
1985.41 Moreover, the type of case that juvenile court judges transfer also
has changed substantially. Person offense cases comprised 33% of the
waived caseload in 1985 but 50% of that caseload in 2013.42 In contrast,
property offense cases comprised 53% of waived cases in 1985 but
declined to 31% of waived cases by 2013.43 Drug offense cases, however,
constituted 12% of the waived cases in 2013, compared to 5% in 1985,
while public order offense cases comprised 6% of all judicially waived
cases in 2013, down from 11% in 1985.44
Additionally, although the likelihood of waiver was lower across all
racial groups in 2013 compared to 1985, black and American-Indian youth
were nonetheless more likely to be waived to criminal court for trial than
37. Furdella & Puzzanchera, supra note 4, at 2.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 3, at 36.
41. Id. at 38. Despite the decline in the number of waived cases, some of the
demographic characteristics of the waived juvenile remain remarkably similar.
Although the percentage of cases involving juveniles over the age of 16 has
declined since 1985, older juveniles still were more likely to be transferred to
criminal court for trial across all offense categories than younger youth in 2013.
Id. at 40.
42. Id. at 39.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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white youth. For example, in 1985, black youth were more likely to be
waived across all offense categories than white youth45 and in 2004, were
more likely to be transferred to criminal court for trial in person and drug
cases than were white.46 Compared to white youth, black youth were as
likely to be waived for property and public order offenses but slightly more
likely to be waived for cases involving person and drug crimes in 2013.47
Nevertheless, the rate at which cases involving black youth were transferred
was 30% greater than for cases involving white youth.48 Similarly, cases
involving American-Indian youth were more likely to be waived than cases
involving white and black youth for public order offenses in 1985,49 person
offenses in 2004,50 and property and drug offense cases in 2013.51
A closer examination of the data, however, reveals an even more
dramatic increase and subsequent decline in the use of judicial waiver
between 1985 and 2013. At its peak in 1994, the number of cases waived
to criminal court was 124% greater than the number waived in 1985.52 The
increases were even more significant when examining the use of judicial
waiver by offense type. For example, the number of person cases waived
in 1994 was 191% greater than in 1985, while the number of drug offense
cases increased by 452% between 1985 and 1995.53 The use of judicial
45. Id. at 40. In 1985, 2.1% of person offense, 1.1% of property offense, 1.5%
of drug offense, and 0.9% of public order offense cases involving black youth
were waived to criminal court. In contrast, 1.8% of person offense, 1.0% of
property offense, 0.7% of drug offense, and 0.5% of public order offense cases
involving white youth were transferred to criminal court. Id.
46. Id. In 2004, 1.2% of person offense cases involving black youth were
waived compared to 1.0% of those cases involving white youth. Similarly, 1.1%
of drug offense cases involving black youth were transferred but only 0.9% of
drug offense cases involving white youth were waived. Id.
47. Id. In 2013, 1.4% of person offense cases involving black youth and 1.1% of
person offense cases involving white youth were waived, and 0.8% of drug offense
cases involving black youth and 0.6% involving white youth were waived. Id.
48. Furdella & Puzzanchera, supra note 4, at 2.
49. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 3, at 40. In 1985, 2.1% of
person offense, 1.0% of property offense, and 1.0% of public order offense cases
involving American-Indian youth were waived to criminal court. Id.
50. Id. In 2004, 1.6% of person offense cases involving American Indians
were waived compared to 1.2% for black and 1.0% for white youth. Id.
51. Id. Of property offense cases involving American-Indian youth, 1.1%
were transferred to criminal court compared to 0.6% of those cases involving
white and black children. Of the drug offense cases, 1.2% involving American
Indians, 0.8% involving blacks, and 0.6% involving whites were waived. Id.
52. Id. at 38.
53. Id.
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waiver then declined by 50% between 1994 and 2001, remained relatively
stable until 2007, and declined by an additional 41% by 2013.54
This substantial decline in the use of judicial waiver might be
attributable to changes in state legislation.55 In response to the increase in
juvenile crime, many jurisdictions enacted legislation that enabled states to try
children in criminal courts without requiring juvenile court judges to make the
transfer decision.56 By redefining the parameters of juvenile court jurisdiction,
states excluded certain juveniles from juvenile court based on their ages, prior
offense histories, or the offenses alleged.57 Other waiver mechanisms gave
prosecutors the discretion to file in criminal court58 or required juvenile courts
to waive if certain criteria were met.59 Consequently, although the use of
judicial waiver declined, other transfer mechanisms may have supplanted the
use of judicial waiver.
Unfortunately, no national data set exists as to the number of juveniles
transferred to criminal court to stand trial through other waiver mechanisms.60
Nevertheless, by some estimates as many as 250,000 children enter the
criminal justice system each year.61 Some data indicate that non-judicial
waiver mechanisms send more children to criminal court than juvenile court
judges’ transfers. For example, between 2011 and 2014, the juvenile court in
New Orleans waived only one case to criminal court for trial through a

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State
Transfer Laws and Reporting, JUV. OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS NAT’L RPT. SERIES
BULL. (Office of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 9.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 4. Many jurisdictions have multiple transfer mechanisms. Id. at 4–5.
60. Id. at 1. In 2010, the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States
Department of Justice solicited proposals for a survey of juveniles charged in
adult courts. The grant was awarded to Westat, which hired the National Center
for Juvenile Justice as a subcontractor. Although the data was supposed to be
available in 2012, the Bureau of Justice Statistics expanded its survey of the data
to include criminal court case processing. The data on juvenile transfer was
expected in 2015. John Kelly, Fed Study on Juveniles in Adult Court Delayed
Until at Least 2015, CHRON. OF SOC. CHANGE (July 29, 2013), https://chronicle
ofsocialchange.org/featured/fed-study-on-juveniles-in-adult-court-delayed-untilat-least-2015/3639 [https://perma.cc/9KEJ-NZLQ]. However, no data has yet
been released.
61. JASON ZIEDENBERG, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., YOU’RE AN ADULT NOW:
YOUTH IN ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 3 (2011).
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discretionary judicial waiver mechanism.62 In comparison, the district
attorney prosecuted 127 youth between the ages of 15 and 16—83% of the
eligible minors—in criminal court through the use of prosecutorial
discretion.63
State-level data indicates a similar trend. In Michigan, the juvenile
court has no jurisdiction over 17-year-olds, who therefore are prosecuted
as adults.64 Of the over 20,000 youth convicted as adults between 2003
and 2013, 95% of those children were 17 years old at the time of the
offense and therefore automatically excluded from the juvenile court.65 In
Florida, over 12,000 youth were tried as adults between 2009 and 2013.66
However, over 97% of these children were tried in criminal court because
of a state law permitting prosecutors to file charges directly without any
hearing or procedure in juvenile court.67
Non-judicial waiver mechanisms accounted for over 90% of all
juvenile transfers to criminal court for trial in Arizona between 2011 and

62. S. POVERTY L. CTR., MORE HARM THAN GOOD: HOW CHILDREN ARE
UNJUSTLY TRIED AS ADULTS IN NEW ORLEANS 11 (2016). Under state law, 17year-olds are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. LA. CONST. ANN. art. V,
§ 19 (2011). Youth 15 and 16 years old charged with certain designated offenses
will be tried in criminal court automatically if either a juvenile court judge or a
grand jury finds probable cause for the minor’s arrest. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
305(A) (2016). Moreover, the district attorney has the discretion to file in criminal
court for other offenses that 15- and 16-year-olds allegedly committed upon a
juvenile court judge’s finding of probable cause or after obtaining a grand jury
indictment. Id. art. 305(B).
63. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 62, at 11. The district attorney filed
charges in criminal court against 127 of the 154 youth eligible to be tried in
criminal court. Moreover, the use of prosecutorial waiver in Orleans Parish far
exceeds its use in other parishes. For example, Caddo Parish tried 39% of its
eligible cases in criminal court, and Jefferson Parish tried 22%, while the rate of
transfer in East Baton Rouge Parish was five times less than in Orleans. Id.
64. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2a (West 2016). A bill to raise the
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction to 18 is pending in the state
legislature. H.B. 4947, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015).
65. MICHELLE WEEMHOFF & KRISTEN STALEY, MICH. COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQ., YOUTH BEHIND BARS 10 (2014).
66. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRANDED FOR LIFE: FLORIDA’S PROSECUTION
OF CHILDREN AS ADULTS UNDER ITS “D IRECT FILE” STATUTE 24 (2014).
Approximately 0.6% of these children were transferred by a juvenile court judge
after a hearing in juvenile court. Id. at 24 n.69.
67. Id. at 24.
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2015.68 Far more cases are filed directly in criminal court by prosecutors
than are transferred by juvenile court judges.69 The vast majority of these
cases, however, are transferred under state statutes that require prosecutors
to file charges directly in criminal court when the minor is a certain age
and is charged with a specified violent offense, is a chronic offender, or
has a designated felony conviction.70 Thus, in 2015, almost 60% of the
cases were automatically filed in criminal court.71
Similarly, more children in California are tried as adults through a
direct-file mechanism than are waived to criminal court for trial. Between
2003 and 2014, juvenile courts transferred 3,193 children to criminal
court, but prosecutors charged 7,162 youth directly in criminal court
during the same time period.72 In 2008, the number of all California cases
68. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT
COUNTS: STATEWIDE STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2015, at 52 (2016).
69. In 2011, prosecutors exercised their discretion to file in criminal court in
42.03% of the transferred cases, while judicial waiver accounted for only 6.59%
of these cases. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE
COURT COUNTS: STATEWIDE STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2011, at 46 (2012).
In 2012 and 2013, prosecutorial discretion was used in 37.91% of the cases and
judicial waiver resulted in 6.5% of the cases waived to criminal court. JUV. JUST.
SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT COUNTS: STATEWIDE
STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2012, at 46 (2013); JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ.
SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT COUNTS: STATEWIDE STATISTICAL
INFORMATION FY 2013, at 46 (2014). In 2014, judicial waiver constituted 5.47%
of all transferred cases, and prosecutorial discretion accounted for 27.73%. JUV.
JUST. SERVS. DIV., ARIZ. SUP. CT., ARIZONA’S JUVENILE COURT COUNTS:
STATEWIDE STATISTICAL INFORMATION FY 2014, at 46 (2015). Judicial waiver
accounted for 5.36% of the transferred cases and prosecutorial discretion
composed 35.27% of these cases in 2015. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra
note 68, at 46. In all years, the majority of cases are transferred pursuant to
mandatory statutory waiver provisions requiring trial in juvenile court based on
the age, offense, and/or prior record of the juvenile.
70. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(A) (2016) (criminal prosecution
shall be brought against a 15-, 16-, or 17-year-old juvenile alleged to have
committed a specified felony offense or who is a chronic felony offender in the
same manner as an adult); Id. § 13-501(C) (criminal prosecution shall be brought
against a juvenile in the same manner as an adult who has allegedly committed a
criminal offense and who has an historical prior felony conviction).
71. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra note 68, at 46.
72. In 2003, juvenile courts waived 404 juveniles, while prosecutors filed
charges in 410 cases directly in criminal court. 2003 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV.
JUST. IN CAL. 6–7. Juvenile courts transferred 252 juveniles in 2004 and
prosecutors directly filed charges in 283 cases. 2004 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV.
JUST. IN CAL. 6–7. In 2005, 318 youth were judicially transferred and 343 were
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tried in criminal court peaked at 866 directly filed and 332 judicially
waived cases73 before declining in 2014 to 474 directly filed and 122
judicially waived cases.74 Nevertheless, the proportion of cases directly
filed in criminal court increased between 2009 and 2013 before declining
in 2014. Thus, in 2009 more than twice as many cases were filed directly
in criminal court than were judicially waived.75 By 2013, more than five
times as many cases involving juvenile defendants were filed by
prosecutors in criminal court than were transferred by juvenile court
judges.76 Although the proportion of directly filed to judicially waived
cases decreased in 2014, criminal courts heard almost four times as many
directly filed cases than judicially waived cases that year.77
From this data, disproportionality clearly remains a hallmark of nonjudicial waiver. Although black youth comprise only 18% of the youth
charged directly in criminal court. 2005 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL.
6–7. Juvenile courts waived 263 juveniles in 2006 and prosecutors filed charges
against 654 youth directly in criminal court. 2006 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST.
IN CAL. 6, 40. In 2007, juvenile court judges transferred 401 youth to criminal
court and 724 were charged in criminal court. 2007 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV.
JUST. IN CAL. 6, 40. In 2008, 332 youth were waived, but 866 were charged
directly in criminal court. 2008 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv, 38. In
2009, prosecutors charged 769 youth directly in criminal court and judges
transferred an additional 346 youth. 2009 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL.
iv, 38. Juvenile courts waived 260 children in 2010 and prosecutors charged 716
youth in criminal court. 2010 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv–v. In
2011, 227 juveniles were waived, but prosecutors charged 686 as adults in
criminal court. 2011 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv, 40. Juvenile
courts transferred 146 youth in 2012, but prosecutors filed charges against 604
youth directly in criminal court. 2012 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv–
v. In 2013, 122 juveniles were waived but 633 were charged directly in criminal
court. 2013 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv–v. Juvenile courts
transferred 122 youth in 2014 and prosecutors filed charges against 474 teens in
criminal court. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. JUV. JUST. IN CAL. iv, 40.
73. 2008 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72.
74. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72.
75. In 2009, prosecutors charged 769 youth directly in criminal court, and
judges transferred an additional 346 youth. 2009 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note
72. The rate of direct filing was more than twice that of judicial waiver.
76. In 2013, 122 juveniles were waived, but 633 were charged directly in
criminal court. 2013 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72. The direct filing rate
was more than five times that of waiver.
77. Juvenile courts transferred 122 youth in 2014, while prosecutors filed
charges against 474 teens in criminal court. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note
72.
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population in Michigan, they account for 59% of all youth tried as adults.78
Moreover, 53% of all 17-year-olds under the jurisdiction of the Michigan
Department of Corrections are youth of color.79 In Florida, although black
children constitute only 27.2% of all arrested youth, they comprise 51.4%
of all cases transferred to criminal court, and white youth account for 28%
of all arrests but only 24.4% of transfers.80 Black teens also are more likely
than whites to be transferred for felony drug or other violent offenses,
although both groups have similar waiver rates for murder and property
offenses.81
In Arizona and California, black and Hispanic youth are disproportionately
represented among all youth tried in criminal courts as adults through nonjudicial transfer mechanisms. Between 2011 and 2015, Hispanic youth
comprised on average 60% of the youth tried because of direct filings in
criminal courts,82 although Hispanic youth between 14 and 17 constituted about
42% of the youth population.83 Black youth comprised only 5% of the 14- to
17-year-old population in the state84 but accounted for between 14% and

WEEMHOFF & STALEY, supra note 65, at 11.
Id. at 10.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 66, at 29.
Id. at 30–31.
In 2011, Hispanic youth composed 62.06% of all direct filings. JUV. JUST.
SERVS. DIV., FY 2011, supra note 69, at 48. In 2012, Hispanic teens constituted
61% of direct filings, JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2012, supra note 69, at pg. 48,
and in 2013, composed 56.42% of direct filings. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2013,
supra note 69, at 48. Hispanic youth accounted for 58.15% of these cases in 2014,
JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2014, supra note 69, at 49, and 59.91% in 2015. JUV.
JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra note 68, at 49. In contrast, white teens, who
compose a greater proportion of the population than any other racial group,
constituted a far smaller percentage of the direct filings. In 2011, cases involving
white youth constituted 20% of the direct filings. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY
2011, supra note 69, at 48. In 2012, 17.37% of the direct filings involved white
youth. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2012, supra note 69, at 48. In 2013, 19.84% of
the filings involved whites. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2013, supra note 69, at 48.
In 2014, 22.47% of these cases involved white youth. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY
2014, supra note 69, at 49. By 2015, the percentage of direct filings against white
youth had declined to 14.62%. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2015, supra note 68, at
49.
83. The population estimate was generated at Nat’l Ctr. For Juv. Just., Easy
Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-2014, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ.
PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov./ojstatbb/ezapop/asp/profile_selection.asp [https:
//perma.cc/PAW9-R5BA] (last updated Sept. 1, 2015).
84. Id.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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21% of teens charged in criminal court.85 In California, black teens made up
about 7% of the 14- to 17-year-old population86 but comprised 27% of the cases
filed directly in criminal court in 2014.87 Prosecutors filed approximately 58%
of the cases against Hispanic youth,88 who constituted about 50% of the relevant
population.89 White youth, in contrast, were charged in only 10% of the cases
in 2014,90 although they comprised about 30% of 14- to 17-year-olds.91 Thus,
although fewer juveniles are sent to criminal court by juvenile court judges, far
more youth are tried as adults in criminal court as a result of non-judicial waiver
mechanisms, and those juveniles are disproportionately youth of color.
C. Consequences of Justice System Involvement
Although trying juveniles as adults may serve the retributive purposes
of the criminal justice system, little evidence of a deterrent effect exists.
Several methodologically sound studies have found that youth tried in
criminal court have higher recidivism rates than those who were tried in
juvenile court.92 Moreover, incarceration in an adult facility seemingly
does not consider the criminogenic effect of adult court processing, as
youth who received even probationary sentences were more likely to
reoffend compared to those tried in the juvenile justice system.93
85. In 2011, black youth composed 14.12% of all direct filings. JUV. JUST.
SERVS. DIV., FY 2011, supra note 69, at 48. In 2012, black teens constituted
16.99% of direct filings, JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2012, supra note 69, at 48,
and in 2013, 20.62% of direct filings. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV., FY 2013, supra note
69, at 48. Blacks accounted for 14.54% of these cases in 2014, JUV. JUST. SERVS.
DIV., FY 2014, supra note 69, at 49, and 20.28% in 2015. JUV. JUST. SERVS. DIV.,
FY 2015, supra note 68, at 49.
86. See supra note 83.
87. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72, at 27.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 83.
90. 2014 CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 72, at 27.
91. See supra note 83.
92. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to
Delinquency?, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash.
D.C.) June 2010, at 6. Redding reviewed several large-scale studies funded by the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention that examined the effect
of waiver on recidivism among juvenile offenders. Id.
93. Id. For seven years researchers followed 2,382 youths, ages 15 and 16,
from a large metropolitan area that covered several counties in New York and
New Jersey. The researchers found that recidivism rates were unrelated to
incarceration in adult institutions as compared to juvenile facilities. Id.
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Additionally, although studies found a reduction in recidivism among
transferred drug offenders, the effect on the recidivism rates of nonviolent
property offenders was mixed.94 Recidivism rates among violent and
presumably the most serious juvenile offenders tried in criminal court,
however, were higher than for youth who remained in the juvenile justice
system.95
Paradoxically, rather than serving as a deterrent, transfer may increase
crime and criminality.96 Researchers have hypothesized that the labeling of a
juvenile offender as a felon has stigmatizing consequences. For example,
being labeled as a felon might significantly affect the youth’s ability to obtain
employment or be reintegrated into his community.97 Other studies suggest
that juveniles may resent the imposition of a sentence they perceive as unjust,
impacting their self-worth, and thus they may defiantly reoffend.98 In adult
facilities, juveniles also learn criminal behavior from adult inmates to protect
themselves from further victimization and consequently accept violence as a
part of their daily routines.99 Finally, the absence of developmentally
appropriate rehabilitative services for juvenile offenders in adult facilities
combined with the loss of family support increases the risk of repeat
offending.100
Transfer laws also may fail to generally deter juveniles from committing
crimes in the first place. Although evidence for a general deterrent effect

94. Id. Two studies in the 1990s found that transfer had no effect on or that it
reduced recidivism. Later studies in the same jurisdiction as the earlier studies,
however, found that transfer did increase recidivism. Id.
95. Id. Six large-scale studies of youth in five different states with different
types of transfer laws found that waiver increases recidivism among youth tried
in criminal court. Id.
96. Id. at 4.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Id. “Many experience the court process . . . as a condemnation of them. . . .
Far from viewing the criminal court . . . as legitimate, the juvenile offenders . . . saw
. . . [it] as duplicitous and manipulative, malevolent in intent, and indifferent to their
needs.” Id. (quoting Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer,
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS
TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 227 (Jeffrey Fagan ed., 2000)).
99. Id. at 7–8. “[I]ncarceration in adult facilities may have brutalizing effects
on juveniles, which may partly account for their increased recidivism. (The term
‘brutalization effect’ describes the finding that homicide rates in a State often
increase after an execution . . . perhaps because executions model and communicate
that violence is an acceptable . . . alternative.)” Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 7.
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is not overwhelming,101 general deterrence is clearly most successful when
potential offenders believe that the chances of being apprehended are high and
that they will receive a substantial sentence. But the deterrent effect is evident
only when offenders actually consider the penalty before engaging in criminal
conduct.102 In one study, researchers found that despite an attempt to raise
public awareness of transfer laws, few juveniles knew about the possibility of
being tried as adults.103 Those who did know did not anticipate that the law
would be enforced against them or that they would receive a serious
punishment.104 The failure to appreciate the risk is consistent with the
immaturity associated with adolescence. Risk-taking and the focus on shortterm gains are consistent with a developing brain and thus make general
deterrence less likely to be effective.105
Other negative effects of transfer to the criminal system exist. One
obvious consequence is the imposition of harsher penalties and the acquisition
of a criminal record with its associated collateral consequences.106 Juveniles
incarcerated in adult facilities also experience higher rates of physical and
sexual abuse and victimization from other inmates as well as staff, perhaps
because of their relative size or inexperience.107 Furthermore, youth
incarcerated in adult correctional facilities have higher rates of mental health
symptoms, including depression, psychological distress and trauma, anxiety,
and post-traumatic stress disorder.108 Incarceration in adult facilities thus
101. It is difficult to conclude if transfer laws have a generally deterrent effect
because it is hard to estimate the amount of crime that might have occurred.
Moreover, whether general deterrence might be attributable to waiver provisions
is unclear. Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult
Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just.
& Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.) Dec. 2012, at 6.
102. Redding, supra note 92, at 4.
103. Richard E. Redding & Elizabeth J. Fuller, What Do Juvenile Offenders
Know About Being Tried as Adults? Implications for Deterrence, 55 JUV. & FAM.
CT. J. 35, 49 (Summer 2004).
104. Id.
105. Redding, supra note 92, at 4.
106. Ian Lambie & Isabel Randell, The Impact of Incarceration on Juvenile
Offenders, 33 C LINICAL P SYCHOL. REV. 448, 454 (2013). By some estimates, as
many as 38,000 collateral consequences of a criminal conviction on the state and
federal levels might exist. Christopher Gowen, Lisa Thurau, & Meghan Wood, The
ABA’s Approach to Juvenile Justice Reform: Education, Eviction, and Employment:
The Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Adjudication, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC.
CHANGE 187, 188 (2011).
107. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 452.
108. Id. at 453.
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may cause many of these problems or even exacerbate their symptoms for
youth with preexisting mental conditions.109
Incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities may limit juveniles’ future
life prospects. Although strong evidence suggests that most juveniles will
grow out of their criminal behavior, prison sentences may delay or impede
that natural process.110 While institutionalized, juveniles certainly engage
with antisocial peers, and those interactions may reinforce criminal
behavior.111 The emphasis on punishment rather than rehabilitation in
adult correctional facilities may preclude the provision of appropriate
educational programs for juvenile offenders, including special education
services.112 The nutritional needs of juveniles often are unmet, and obesity
resulting from their sedentary lifestyles is concerning.113 Moreover,
substance abuse and sexual activity that occur in prison could have longterm health effects for juveniles once they are released.114 Finally,
sufficient aftercare programming might not exist for juveniles after they
are released from adult facilities, which cripples their ability to reintegrate
into their communities.115
Nevertheless, although it is clear that juvenile facilities are preferable
to adult prisons for youth, institutionalization has negative effects on
youth. Although most juveniles age out of criminal offending as they
become psychosocially mature,116 institutionalization might delay
109. Id.
110. Id. at 451. Several studies have found that although many juveniles engage
in serious delinquent behavior, almost all naturally stop offending as they mature. For
example, one study found that only a small percentage of juvenile offenders continued
with their serious offending, and even those offenders reported a decrease in offenses
as they aged. Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights From Pathways to Desistance: A
Longitudinal Study of Serious Adolescent Offending, JUV. JUST. FACT SHEET (Off. of
Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.) Mar. 2011, at 3.
111. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 451. See also Committee on
Adolescence, American Academy of Pediatrics, Health Care for Youth in the Juvenile
Justice System, 128 PEDIATRICS 1219, 1229 (2011) (“Juveniles in adult prisons report
learning more about criminal behavior from adult inmates . . . .”).
112. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 454.
113. Id.
114. Id. Researchers hypothesize that increased risk-taking may lead adolescents
to engage in unsafe sexual practices, substance abuse, and violence. Id.
115. Id. at 454–55.
116. Laurence Steinberg, Elizabeth Cauffman & Kathryn C. Monahan,
Psychosocial Maturity and Desistance From Crime in a Sample of Serious
Juvenile Offenders JUV. JUST. BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention,
Wash. D.C.) Mar. 2015, at 9. The researchers studied 1,300 juvenile offenders for
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maturation by impeding the development of a pro-social lifestyle.117
Certainly, as in adult facilities, juveniles are exposed to more antisocial
peers,118 may have less contact with family and community,119 and may
exhibit more aggressive behavior.120 Further, other juveniles and staff
physically and sexually victimize juveniles,121 which may increase the risk
of suicide or suicidal ideation.122 Incarceration also disrupts educational
achievement because juvenile facilities tend to provide an inferior
educational experience for youth,123 and their physical health may suffer
because of risks associated with violence, substance abuse, sexual activity,
or the more sedentary lifestyle experienced while institutionalized.124
Conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities also may contribute to
the pain juveniles experience while incarcerated. Most juvenile offenders
are held in public facilities125 that overwhelmingly have one or more
confinement features, such as fences or walls with razor wire, internal
security doors, or secure day rooms for youth.126 Staff often use mechanical
restraints such as handcuffs, restraining chairs, strait jackets, leg cuffs, or
leather straps.127 They may rely on some type of isolation, often locking
youth in their rooms for four or more hours, particularly in training schools,
reception centers, and detention centers.128 Despite a decline in both the

seven years after conviction. Involvement in delinquent and criminal behavior
increased through adolescence, peaking at about age 16 or 17. Although a small
number continued to offend, the vast majority stopped engaging in criminal
behavior as they became more psychosocially mature. Id. at 2.
117. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 454–55.
118. Id. at 451.
119. Id. at 454.
120. Id. at 452.
121. Id. at 452–53.
122. Id. at 453–54.
123. Id. at 454.
124. Id.
125. Sarah Hockenberry, Melissa Sickmund & Anthony Sladky, Juvenile
Residential Facility Census, 2012: Selected Findings, JUV. OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS NAT’L RPT. SERIES BULL. (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention,
Laurel, MD.), Mar. 2015, at 3.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 12. Mechanical restraints are used by 58% of training schools, 46%
of reception centers, and 40% of detention centers. Id.
128. Id. Youth are locked in their rooms for four or more hours at 47% of
training schools, 44% of detention centers, and 32% of reception centers. Id.
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number of juvenile facilities and the number of offenders,129 overcrowding
remains a problem at one in five juvenile facilities.130 Moreover, suicide
was the most common cause of death among youth held in juvenile
facilities131 with most occurring weeks after admission.132
The collateral consequences of juvenile adjudications are extensive and
could affect juveniles well into their adult lives. Juveniles might be suspended
or expelled from school, thereby affecting their future educational and
employment opportunities.133 Their juvenile records could be made available
to prospective employers who might be unwilling to hire youths with juvenile
records.134 Juveniles might be required to reveal their prior juvenile court
involvement on college and graduate school applications or when applying
for a professional license, which could result in the application’s denial.135
Sex offender registration laws might require juveniles to register well into
adulthood and might trigger community-notification requirements that
might affect juveniles’ ability to remain in the neighborhood.136 Both sex
offender registration laws and drug-related convictions could result in an
eviction from public housing of juveniles and their entire families, even if
other family members were not at fault.137 Although juveniles might not
be deported based on delinquency adjudications, they can be deported
129. Id. at 8. Between 2000 and 2012, the number of juvenile facilities
declined 35% and the number of offenders declined 47%. Id.
130. Id. at 10. Facilities holding between 1 and 10 residents reported the
highest rate of overcrowding at 24%, followed by facilities with 21 to 50 residents
at 23%. Id.
131. Id. at 13. In the one-year reporting period between October 1, 2011 and
September 30, 2012, 14 youth died in juvenile facilities. Five deaths were due to
suicide, four were attributable to illness or natural causes, three were accidents,
and two were due to homicide. The death rate was higher for private facilities.
Most deaths occurred at detention facilities. Id.
132. Id. at 14. One suicide, however, did occur on the youth’s first day of
admission. Id.
133. Gowen et al., supra note 106, at 193–94.
134. RIYA SAHA SHAH & JEAN STOUT, JUV. LAW CTR., FUTURE INTERRUPTED:
THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS
11 (Feb. 2016). One study found that black youth were more likely to be denied
employment than white youth. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 10; Gowen et al., supra note 106, at 194–96.
136. See, e.g., KATHERINE HUNT FEDERLE, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH WITH CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTS 357
(2013).
137. Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called “Out” at Home: The One
Strike Eviction Policy and Juvenile Court, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 109,
112 (2011).
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based on their bad acts.138 Moreover, if the conviction relates to drug
trafficking, the offender’s age is irrelevant.139 A juvenile might be unable to
enlist in the military, could lose driving privileges,140 or even be barred from
obtaining federal financial aid for college.141
In summary, juvenile court involvement exposes children to
consequences that could last a lifetime. Although evidence suggests that
most youth grow out of juvenile offending, prolonged exposure to juvenile
justice system mechanisms might delay or impede their maturation. In fact,
juvenile court involvement could have iatrogenic effects.142 Additionally,
transferring juveniles to the adult system for prosecution and punishment
has even more serious and long-lasting effects. The paradox is that justice
system involvement may actually result in both more offenses and graver
offenses.
II. THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that
children are constitutionally different from adults and that these differences
require the singular treatment of children at sentencing.143 First, because of
their immaturity and impulsiveness, children are more likely to engage in
behaviors and make decisions that are ill-considered.144 Second, they are
more likely to succumb to negative influences and peer pressure, and
because they have less control over their environment, they cannot easily
extricate themselves from these situations.145 Finally, because children are

138. Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportation with Inadequate Due
Process: The Devastating Consequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law
Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 90 (2011).
139. Id. at 91.
140. SHAH & STOUT, supra note 134, at 9.
141. Id. at 11. Pell Grant funding will be denied to anyone incarcerated in any
federal or state penal institution. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. (1994).
142. Lambie & Randell, supra note 106, at 452. Peer contagion could explain
this effect; that is, youths’ confinement with other, more antisocial youth might
result in their further criminalization. Id.
143. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
144. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
145. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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less developed and their personality traits more mutable, they are less
likely to be “irretrievably depraved.”146
Given these differences, the Court found that the justifications for
punishment apply with less force to children. Children are not as morally
culpable because of their immaturity and diminished sense of responsibility;
thus retributivist justifications for punishment are not as great as for
adults.147 Moreover, the impetuosity of youth renders deterrence an unlikely
and possibly unattainable goal because it is premised on the notion that the
individual can and will engage in a cost-benefit analysis before offending.148
Even the incapacitation of juveniles under certain conditions cannot be
justified if the decision to imprison is made without consideration of their
potential for growth and change.149 Because children are still maturing and
their characters still forming, the conclusion that they are beyond the reach
of society is less supportable.150
The context in which these Supreme Court cases arose, however, is a
relatively narrow one—the cases all involved children who had been
transferred to criminal court to be tried as adults.151 Furthermore, the
sentences the Court considered are the harshest sentences that could be
imposed in the criminal justice system: the death penalty and life without
the possibility of parole.152 The Court held that the imposition of the death
146. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; accord Miller, 132 S. Ct.
at 2464.
147. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
148. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 72; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72.
149. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
150. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
151. Christopher Simmons, who was 17 when he committed the offense, was
tried automatically as an adult in a Missouri criminal court. Roper, 543 U.S. at
557. Terrance Graham was tried as an adult based on the prosecutor’s decision to
file charges in criminal court. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53. The life sentence was
imposed after Graham admitted to violating the terms of his probation by fleeing
from police officers. Id. at 55–57. Evan Miller was 14 years old at the time of the
crime. A juvenile court judge waived Miller to criminal court on the motion of the
district attorney and after a hearing. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. In the companion
case, Kuntrell Jackson, who also was 14 at the time of the offense, was charged
as an adult under a statute that gave the prosecutor discretion to file in criminal
court. Id. at 2461.
152. In Roper, Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death. 543 U.S. at 558.
In Graham, Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole for a non-homicide offense. 560 U.S. at 57. In Miller, both Evan Miller and
Kuntrell Jackson received mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of
parole for their homicide offenses. 132 S. Ct. 2461, 2463.
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penalty on a juvenile who committed the crime before the age of 18
violated the Eighth Amendment because youth are “categorically less
culpable,” thereby rendering a sentence of death disproportionate.153
Similarly, life without the possibility of parole when the accused has not
killed is categorically barred if the offender is under the age of 18 when
the offense occurred.154 Moreover, the Court concluded that a mandatory
sentence of life without the possibility of parole when the minor does kill
is unconstitutional in the absence of an individualized, yet “uncommon,”
determination about the appropriateness of the sentence.155 Thus life
without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense and death for
anyone under the age of 18 are categorically barred. Life without parole
for a homicide offense, however, may be imposed but only after an
individualized judicial determination about the appropriateness of such a
sentence.
The Court also rejected the argument that the discretion exercised
when transferring a juvenile to adult court for trial is the constitutional
equivalent of the discretion exercised during post-trial sentencing in
criminal court. Mandatory waiver provisions do not involve the exercise of
discretion and thus cannot serve as a substitute for the type of individualized
determinations the Court envisioned.156 Nor is prosecutorial discretion
satisfactory in the absence of judicial reevaluation or review.157 Even a
judge’s decision to transfer a minor to criminal court for trial is insufficient
because of the paucity of information generally available to the court when
the judge makes the transfer decision.158 Furthermore, the decision to
waive a minor to criminal court might stem from a judicial determination
that the minor warrants more punishment than the juvenile court can mete
out.159 This determination, however, does not necessarily mean that life
without the possibility of parole is warranted.160
There are a number of reforms suggested by the Supreme Court’s
conclusion that children are constitutionally different. There are those
directly mandated by the Court’s jurisprudence, such as no juvenile
offender shall be executed for a crime committed under the age of 18 and
no minor shall serve a mandatory life sentence in a non-homicide case
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
Id. at 2474.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2475.
Id. at 2474–75.
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without the possibility of parole. Moreover, a life sentence without the
possibility of parole cannot be imposed without an individualized
determination that the minor is one of the rare juveniles who warrants this
punishment. Indeed, the various mechanisms by which juveniles are
waived to criminal court are inadequate substitutes for the determination
made by the judge that a juvenile should receive life without the possibility
of parole.
Some commentators, however, suggest that these cases have a much
broader reach. For example, some argue that the imposition of any
mandatory sentence on a juvenile is unconstitutional because it precludes
any individualized determination that the sentence is warranted.161 Within
such a framework, parole eligibility would be expanded and juveniles
would be entitled to more frequent parole hearings.162 Moreover, the
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, such as a criminal record
or lifetime registration requirements for sex offenders, should be limited
when the offender is a juvenile.163 Even criminal sentencing enhancement
provisions, which allow the court to consider a juvenile adjudication as a
predicate offense, would run afoul of the Constitution under this view.164
Additionally, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has
applicability to other aspects of the juvenile justice system. For example,
a juvenile court judge’s decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court for
trial suggests nothing about the appropriateness of any criminal sentence he
may receive. The Court’s emphasis on the psychosocial development of
children would militate in favor of a juvenile justice system that would retain
jurisdiction over older teenage offenders.165 Furthermore, programming
should be rehabilitative to facilitate reform.166 Similarly, the collateral
consequences of juvenile adjudication, particularly those extending well
into adulthood, should be reconsidered in light of the Court’s emphasis on
the lessened moral culpability of youth.167
Although juveniles obviously have an Eighth Amendment right, to
what extent that right applies outside the limited context of the Supreme
Court cases is unclear. For example, whether the right extends to the quasi161. ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., MODELS FOR CHANGE: SYSTEMS REFORM IN
JUV. JUST., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE
SENTENCING 26 (Sep. 2015).
162. Id. at 27–29.
163. Id. at 27.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 29.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 27.
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criminal proceedings within the juvenile court itself is uncertain given that
a juvenile court adjudication arguably provides a lesser and more
proportional punishment than the punishment within the criminal justice
system. Moreover, the Court did not preclude the imposition of life
without the possibility of parole in a homicide case if an individualized
determination that passes constitutional muster occurs.168 The Court
rejected a categorical bar on all sentences of life without parole albeit with
the understanding that the sentencing party will consider all the
circumstances of the juvenile offender and how those circumstances may
warrant mitigation at sentencing.169 Finally, the Court did recognize that
some juveniles deserve severe punishment.170
Although the Court has recognized that children do have constitutional
rights, many of those rights are analyzed within a framework applicable to
all constitutional persons. In the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has
applied a disproportionality analysis in determining whether juveniles may
be executed or given a life sentence.171 The offender’s status as a child can
bar the imposition of certain types of punishment, just as the offender’s
status as a mentally disabled offender would,172 but the child’s status as
an offender does not prohibit the imposition of all criminal sanctions.
Retribution, deterrence, and incarceration remain as valid state responses
to juvenile offending. This jurisprudential narrative thus begins and ends
with punishment.
B. The Right to Redemption
Articulating a separate theoretical framework that applies to the rights
of children is therefore critical. The law, however, emphasizes competence
as a prerequisite to having and exercising rights; thus formulating a
framework for children within such a construct has been difficult.173
168. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (the Eighth Amendment
does not require a categorical bar on the imposition of life without possibility for
parole on juvenile offenders who kill, but the imposition of such a sentence will
be uncommon).
169. Id.
170. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010) (“Graham deserved to be
separated from society for some time.”).
171. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 59–62; Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005).
172. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
173. Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for
Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
983 (1993).
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Rather, a framework for children’s rights should emphasize children’s
powerlessness. Children, because they are powerless, have rights claims
against the more powerful.174 In juvenile and criminal offending,
therefore, children would have claims against the state because the state is
obviously holding the balance of power; to put it succinctly, rights flow to
the powerless.175
The child’s claim of a right to redemption checks the state’s exercise
of power. That rights claim is more expansive than simply the right against
cruel and unusual punishment embedded in the Eighth Amendment. The
right to redemption looks beyond punishment and envisions the
reintegration of the child into society as a fully functioning citizen. This
right thus imposes on the state a correlative duty to provide the means by
which the child may have that future. Framing the right in this way
changes the narrative from what the state has the power to do to the child
to one in which the child may claim state-created opportunities for
rehabilitation and reform.
Although the right to redemption might seemingly be a radical
departure from other rights that are accorded children, the framework for
such a right is not new. Article 40(1) of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) recognizes that when a child is accused
of or has violated a State Party’s penal law, the child has the right to be
“treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of
dignity and worth.”176 The State Party must take into account the child’s
age, the desirability of promoting the child’s re-integration into society, and
the child’s assumption of a constructive role in society.177 Moreover, Article
40(3) states that States Parties must create specialized procedures for
juveniles accused of violating the law and resort to judicial proceedings only
when appropriate.178 Finally, Article 40(4) envisions treatment that is
“appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their
circumstances and the offence” as an alternative to treatment.179

174. For a more complete discussion of the empowerment perspective, see
Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights Flow Downhill, 2 INT’L. J. CHILD. RTS. 343 (1994).
175. Id.
176. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 40(1), Nov.
20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1577 U.N.T.S. 56.
177. Id.
178. Id. at art. 40(3).
179. Id. at art. 40(4).

2016]

THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION

71

Although the United States is the only country that has not ratified the
CRC,180 the Supreme Court has found its provisions instructive in the
Eighth Amendment context. In considering the constitutionality of the
death penalty as applied to minors, for example, the Court noted that
Article 37 of the CRC expressly prohibits capital punishment of offenders
who committed their crimes when they were under 18.181 In concluding
that the Constitution categorically bars the imposition of life without the
possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses that juveniles commit, the
Supreme Court again referenced Article 37, which also prohibits “life
imprisonment without the possibility of release . . . for offences [sic]
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”182 In both cases, the
Court stated with some dismay that “the United States now stands alone
in a world that has turned its face against” these penalties for children.183
Additionally, the Court seemed to imply that a deeper and more
meaningful right might exist. In discussing the application of the death
penalty and life without the possibility of parole to offenders who
committed their crimes before the age of 18, the Court’s language suggests
that minors are not beyond redemption. The Court argued that “juveniles
have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment”184 and that “[f]rom a
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s
character deficiencies will be reformed.”185 The Court rejected the
argument that juveniles are “irretrievably depraved”186 and noted that
these penalties are a “denial of hope.”187 Finally, the Court expressly
stated that “juvenile[s] should not be deprived of the opportunity to
achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and
potential.”188
180. Committee on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex
.aspx [https://perma.cc/GLB2-34WQ] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
181. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
182. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010).
183. Id.; Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
184. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; accord Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (emphasis added).
187. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev.
1989)) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 79.
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“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults”189 is the Court’s
most powerful articulation of a right to redemption. “Youth matters,”190
the Court emphasized, because children lack maturity and are impulsive.
Youth matters because children are subject to negative influences and have
less control over their environments. Youth matters because children are
capable of change. They are not simply “miniature adults”191 but unique
constitutional persons to whom special principles must apply. “Indeed, it
is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for
children.”192
Furthermore, the Court’s acknowledgment that children are relatively
powerless supports a right to redemption grounded in a jurisprudential
framework in which rights flow to the less powerful. The Court noted that
children are particularly vulnerable because they cannot easily escape the
negative influences to which they might be subjected.193 Moreover, the
Court recognized that children remain vulnerable within the justice system
itself because the procedures by which juveniles are tried in criminal court
fail to protect them. When juveniles are transferred automatically, they
receive no individualized determination of the appropriateness or
suitability of the transfer.194 But even when a court decides to transfer a
minor, that exercise of judicial discretion often occurs in the absence of
full information and may be driven by considerations other than the child’s
immaturity.195 Thus the Court’s imposition of categorical rules stems from
the Court’s concern that assessments of culpability will be subjective and
inaccurate.196
A right to redemption thus offers a way forward. By recognizing that
children are different, a more coherent children’s rights theory that
accommodates their inherent powerlessness may be formulated. The fact
that the state has power is indisputable, and checking that power requires
a right. Rights do more than simply allow the claimant to be heard: they
command the attention and respect of the powerful and raise the claimants
up so that they might be heard. In asserting a right to redemption, the
189. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732
(2016), confirmed that the Court was announcing a constitutional rule when the
Court held that the rule articulated in Miller was a new substantive constitutional
rule retroactive in cases on state collateral review.
190. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
191. Id. at 2470.
192. Id.
193. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
194. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
195. Id.
196. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 76–78.
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conversation changes from a discussion about punishment to one about
reformation and respect and ultimately to the recognition that children
have special rights that consider their vulnerabilities and powerlessness.
CONCLUSION
While it is clear that fewer juveniles are offending, youth of color
remain disproportionately involved with the juvenile and criminal justice
systems. For these youth, the emphasis often remains on punishment and
accountability rather than reformation. But if we begin from the premise
that children have a right to redemption—a right suggested by the Supreme
Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—then we may begin to
understand the promise of children’s rights.

